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a b s t r a c t
Secret sharing plays an important role in protecting conﬁdential information from being lost,
destroyed, or falling into wrong hands. Veriﬁable multi-secret sharing enables a dealer to
share multiple secrets among a group of participants such that the deceptive behaviors of
the dealer and the participants can be detected. In this paper, we analyze the security of sev-
eral recently proposed veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes. We show that these schemes
cannot withstand some deceptive behaviors of the dealer, and hence fails to satisfy the basic
requirement of secure veriﬁable secret sharing schemes. After that, we present two improved
veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes. Our new schemes can not only resist cheating by the
dealer or participants, but also remove the use of private channels.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Secret sharing plays an important role in protecting important information from getting lost, destroyed, or falling into wrong
hands. It has many practical applications, such as safeguarding very conﬁdential information, opening a bank vault, launching a
missile, etc. In 1979, the ﬁrst (t,n) threshold secret sharing schemeswere proposed by Shamir [29] and Blakley [2] independently.
In a (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme, a secret can be shared among n participants such that t or more participants can
reconstruct the secret, but t − 1 or fewer participants can not. In real applications, it is known that traditional secret sharing
schemes like Shamir’s and Blakley’s cannot solve the following problems:
(1) Only one secret can be shared during one secret sharing process, they cannot be used to share multiple secrets simultane-
ously.
(2) The shadows of participants are not reusable. Once the secret has been reconstructed, all shadowswill no longer be private.
(3) Deceptive behaviors of a dishonest dealer cannot be detected. A dishonest dealer may distribute a fake shadow to a certain
participant, and then that participant would subsequently never obtain the true secret.
(4) Deceptive behaviors of a malicious participant cannot be prevented in the process of reconstruction. A malicious partici-
pant may provided a fake shadow to cheat the other participants to prevent them from reconstructing the true secret.
(5) Private channels are required for the communications between the dealer and participants.
(6) The dealer knows all shadows of participants. The shadows of participants are not reusable for different dealers.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 25 85891990; fax: +86 13813945429.
E-mail addresses: angelpray@126.com (Y. Liu), ffttzhang@sina.com, zhangfutai@njnu.edu.cn (F. Zhang), 464516929@qq.com (J. Zhang).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2015.09.040
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[6] have been introduced. A number of multi-secret sharing schemes and veriﬁable secret sharing schemes [5,7–9,23,33,35] have
been presented. Using multi-secret sharing schemes [4,13,22], the drawback in (1) can be removed. To deal with the drawback in
(2), Jackson et al. [20] have further introduced multi-use secret sharing schemes. The difference is that the shadow kept by each
participant in a multi-use scheme is reusable after secret reconstruction.
To overcome the problems both in (1) and (2), He and Dawson [15] proposed a MSS scheme. One year later, they [16] put
forward a dynamic MSS scheme based on two-variable one-way function. Two other practical MSS schemes were presented by
Chien et al. [5] in 2000 and Yang et al. [33] in 2004 respectively. Pang and Wang [23] pointed out although the reconstruction in
Yang’s scheme is easier than in Chien’s scheme, more public values are requiredwhen p < t. They also demonstrated an improved
scheme based on interpolation method. However, Li et al. [21] pointed out Pang el al.’s scheme needs to generate a polynomial
of degree (n+p-1) in both the secret distribution and the secret reconstruction. And hence the eﬃciency is unfavorable when p is
very large. They presented a new (t,n) threshold multi-secret sharing scheme using interpolation method. Some vulnerabilities
of MSS schemes using polynomial interpolation were shown by Sahasranand et al. in [28]. They pointed out that a scheme based
on interpolation method cannot be used to implement a (k, t,n) scheme when the k secrets to be distributed are inherently
generated from a polynomial of degree less than k − 1, and the scheme does not work if all of the secrets to be shared are the
same, etc. Although the drawbacks in (1) and (2) may be eliminated in these MSS schemes, the problems in (3)–(6) still exist.
To do away with the drawback in (3), Chor et al. [6] have initiated the study of veriﬁable secret sharing (VSS). In a VSS scheme,
participants are able to verify that their shadows are consistent, and cheating by a dishonest dealer can be detected. VSS is
now a fundamental tool in cryptographic research [14]. In order to resolve the problem in (4), cheating immune secret sharing
[24–26,34] and publicly veriﬁable secret sharing (PVSS) [31] were investigated. The PVSS scheme presented by Stadler can detect
not only cheating by the dealer but also the cheating by any participants.
Taking the problems in (1)–(4) into consideration, Harn [13] has introduced a (t,n) threshold veriﬁable multi-secret sharing
(VMSS) scheme which can detect both malicious dealer and dishonest participants. In Harn’s scheme, every participant keeps
only one reusable shadow for sharing any set of secrets. However, Lin and Wu [22] pointed out that Harn’s scheme suffered
from the problems of large amount (n!/((n − t)! · t!)) of modular exponentiations and running interactive veriﬁcation protocol
to verify the validity of shadows. Chen et al. [4] presented an alternative (t,n) VSS scheme to avoid the disadvantages in Harn’s
scheme. However, Lin andWu [22] showed that Chen et al.’s scheme is ineﬃcient because the dealer has to record all participants’
shadows and take 2n modular exponentiations to compute an n-dimensional veriﬁcation vector for each shared secret. Lin and
Wu put forward a (t,n) threshold VMSS scheme (LW scheme) based on the intractability of factorization and the hardness of the
discrete logarithm problemmodulo a composite [22]. In [17], He and Wu have indicated that LW scheme can’t resist cheating by
participants, because a malicious participant can provide a fake subshadow to cheat other honest participants. An improvement
of the LW scheme was given by Chang et al. [3]. The improved scheme not only successfully overcomes the drawbacks of LW
scheme, but also is computationally more eﬃcient than the other VMSS schemes. Unfortunately, Huang et al. [18] identiﬁed that
Chang’s VMSS scheme could not withstand conspiracy attack. They showed that any t + 1 participants can conspire to compute
the system’s secret R or φ(N) with high probability. Subsequently, these malicious participants could reconstruct the shared
secret independently.
In 2004, Yang et al. [33] proposed a relatively eﬃcient multi-secret sharing scheme (YCH scheme). But Shao and Cao pointed
out that this scheme does not enjoy the property of veriﬁability, and presented a modiﬁed scheme (SC scheme) [30] by adding
the property of veriﬁability based on Feldman’s [12] VSS scheme. Note that, in the SC scheme, all shadows are computed by
the dealer and private channels are required for the dealer to distribute shadows to participants. So the problems in (5) and (6)
remain unsolved. In 2006, Zhao et al. [35] introduced a practical veriﬁable multi-secret sharing scheme (ZZZ scheme) based on
YCH scheme and Hwang–Chang’s scheme (HC scheme) [19]. The veriﬁcation phase of the ZZZ scheme is the same as that of the
HC scheme. By making use of the techniques of public key cryptography [32], e.g. RSA cryptosystem [27] and Diﬃe–Hellman
key agreement [10] method, the ZZZ scheme and HC scheme realized secret sharing without private channels. This property is
particularly signiﬁcant in applications where private channels are hard to set up. In these schemes, each participant chooses his
secret shadow by himself. Hence the problems in (5) and (6) could be solved simultaneously. Similar to ZZZ scheme, the VMS
schemes presented in [8,9] were also dealt with the problems in (5) and (6). For simplicity, we call the scheme in [8] MS scheme,
the type 1 scheme in [9] the MS1 scheme, the type 2 scheme in [9] the MS2 scheme.
Although it was claimed that these schemes (ZZZ scheme, MS scheme, MS1 scheme, MS2 scheme) could identify cheating by
both the dealer and the participants, unfortunately, we ﬁnd that their claims are wrong.
In this paper, we analyze the security drawbacks of these veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes, including the ZZZ scheme,
MS scheme, MS1 scheme, MS2 scheme. We demonstrate how a dishonest dealer can cheat a participant without being detected
in all these schemes. So these schemes cannot withstand cheating by dishonest dealer.
In addition, taking into account all the problems (1) to (6) , we also propose two new veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes.
Our new schemes have the following features:
(1) The dealer can arbitrarily give any set of secrets for sharing, and only one shadow, which is reusable, should be kept by
each participant. This solves the problems in (1) and (2).
(2) Every participant can detect any cheating by the dealer. This solves the problem in (3).
(3) Every participant can detect the cheating by any other participants by using a non-interactive protocol. This solves the
problem in (4).
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(5) The dealer does not know each participant’s shadow. The shadows of participants can be reusable for the different round
of sharing. This solves the problem in (6).
With these features, our new schemes can be applied in many practical situations, such as authenticating an electronic funds
transfer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the concepts of RSA encryption scheme and homogeneous
linear recursion (HLR)whichwill be building blocks in constructing our newVMSS schemes. Thenwe describe the securitymodel
for VMSS schemes. The security analysis and attacks on several veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes are shown in Section 3.
Our new veriﬁable multi-secrets sharing scheme without a private channel is depicted in Section 4 followed by security analysis.
In Section 5 we give performance analysis of our new VMSS schemes. Finally, Section 6 concludes our paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. RSA encryption scheme
RSA is one of the best known public-key encryption schemes named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [27]. It is
is the ﬁrst practical realization of public-key encryption scheme based on the notion of one-way trapdoor function introduced
by Diﬃe and Hellman [10,11]. The security of RSA is based on the hardness of large integer factorization.
The RSA encryption scheme is speciﬁed as follows:
Key setup: A user Alice performs the following steps to generate her public and private keys.
1. choose two random prime numbers p and q such that |p| ≈ |q|;
2. compute N = pq;
3. compute φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1);
4. choose a random integer e < φ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1, and compute the integer d such that
ed ≡ 1(mod φ(N));
5. publish (N, e) as her public key, safely destroy p, q and φ(N), and keep d as her private key.
Encryption: To send a conﬁdential messagem ∈ ZN to Alice, the sender Bob creates the ciphertext c as follows
c ← me(mod N).
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext c, Alice computes
m ← cd(mod N).
2.2. Homogeneous linear recursion (HLR)
In this section we brieﬂy introduce homogeneous linear recursion which forms the mathematical background of our second
scheme. A detailed description of homogeneous linear recursion can be found in [1].
Deﬁnition 1. Let t be a positive integer and c1, c2, . . . , ct , a1, a2, . . . , at be real numbers. A homogeneous linear recursion of
degree t is deﬁned by the equations
[HLR]
{
u0 = c1,u1 = c2, . . . ,ut−1 = ct ,
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 (i ≥ 0)
where c1, c2, . . . , ct and a1, a2, . . . , at are constants.
Deﬁnition 2. We deﬁne the auxiliary equation for [HLR] to be
xt + a1xt−1 + · · · + at = 0.
We shall assume that the auxiliary equation has t roots, which will certainly be the case if wework in the ﬁeldC of complex num-
bers. However, the t roots do not need to be distinct, and we shall suppose that the distinct values are α1, α2, . . . , αl , occurring
with multiplicitiesm1,m2, . . . ,ml , respectively. In other words, the auxiliary equation can be rewritten as
(x − α1)m1(x − α2)m2 . . . (x − αl)ml = 0,
wherem1 + m2 + · · · + ml = t .
Lemma 1. Suppose sequence {ui} is deﬁned by [HLR], and the auxiliary equation has roots α1, α2, . . . , αl with multiplicities
m1,m2, . . . ,ml. Then
ui = p1(i)αi1 + p2(i)αi2 + · · · + pl(i)αil ,
where, for j = 1,2, . . . , l, pj(i) is an expression of the form A0 + A1i + · · · + A(mj−1)i
(mj−1). In other words, pj(i) is a polynomial function
of i with degree at most mj − 1.
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t2.3. Security model of VMSS schemes
A (t, n) VMSS scheme without private channels involves a dealer D and a set M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} of n participants. It is
composed of the following 4 phases.
1. Initialization: The dealer sets up the system parameters which may include its private information and some public data
authentically available to all participants. All participants choose their secret shadows and compute the corresponding public
information respectively. Then each participant authenticates its identity and public information to the dealer. After that the
dealer publishes the public parameters, the identities and public information of all participants.
2. Construction: For a set of secrets to be shared, the dealer D computes subshadows and corresponding veriﬁcation information
for all participants. D authentically publishes all veriﬁcation information.
3. Veriﬁcation: Each participant gets its subshadow from veriﬁcation information. Then it checks the validity of its subshadow
using the public information.
4. Recovery: t or more participants cooperate to recover the shared secrets. Each of them supplies its subshadow to the others.
They verify the validity of each subshadow. When at least t valid subshadows are collected, they can compute all shared
secrets using a predetermined algorithm.
With regard to the security, a (t, n) VMSS scheme without private channels must satisfy the following requirements.
1. Correctness: If the dealer and the participants act honestly, any t or more participants can reconstruct the secret correctly
during the execution of the reconstruction algorithm.
2. Veriﬁability:
− Any deceptive behavior of the dealer can be identiﬁed in the veriﬁcation phase.
− In the recovery phase, a dishonest participant who supplies a fake subshadow can be identiﬁed by the others.
3. Privacy: Any collusion of less than t participants cannot obtain any of the shared secrets.
According to these security requirements, in the security model of VMSS schemes, we characterize three types of adversaries.
One is a dishonest dealer who aims to cheat some participants by distributing to them invalid subshadows. We say a dishonest
dealer succeeds if it distributes an invalid subshadow to a participant without being detected with a non-negligible probability.
The second is a cheating participant who aims to submit a fake subshadow without being detected in the recovery phase. Such
an adversary succeeds if it submits a fake subshadow without being detected with a non-negligible probability. Another is an
adversary who is not the dealer but corrupts up to t − 1 participants. An adversary of this kind gets complete control of up to
− 1 corrupted participants and aims to extract some information of the shared secrets. We say such an adversary succeeds if
it can get some information of the shared secrets other than those can be induced from public information and the information
owned by the corrupted participants with a non-negligible probability.
Deﬁnition 3. A a (t, n) VMSS scheme without private channels is said secure if it satisﬁes Correctness and no adversary can
succeed with a non-negligible probability.
3. Security analysis and attacks to several veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes
3.1. Security analysis and attack on ZZZ scheme [35]
3.1.1. Brief review of ZZZ scheme
• Initialization phase
Let P1, P2, . . . , Pk denote k secrets to be shared. Firstly, the dealer D chooses two large strong primes, p and q, computes N = pq.
D randomly chooses an integer g from the interval [N1/2,N] such that g is relatively prime to p and q. D publishes {g,N}.
LetM = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} be the set of participants. Each participantMi inM randomly chooses an integer si from the interval
[2,N] as her/his own secret shadow and computes Ri = gsi mod N, then Mi provides Ri and her/his identity information IDi,
to the dealer D. D must ensure that Ri = Rj for all i = j. Once Ri = Rj, D should demand these participants to choose different
secret shadows until R′
i
s are different for i = 1,2, . . . ,n. D publishes {(IDi,Ri)}.
• Construction phase
The dealer D performs the following steps
(1) Randomly choose an integer s0 from the interval [2,N] such that s0 is relatively prime to (p− 1) and (q − 1). Then D
computes f such that s0 × f = 1 mod φ(N), where φ(N) is the Euler phi-function;
(2) Compute R0 = gs0 mod N and Ii = Rs0i mod N, (i = 1,2, . . . ,n);
(3) Publish {R0, f}.
In case k ≤ t,
– Choose a prime Q and construct (t − 1)th degree polynomial h(x)modQ,
h(x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q,
where 0 < P1, P2, , Pk, a1, a2, . . . , at−k < Q;
– Compute y = h(I ) mod Q for i = 1,2, . . . ,n;i i
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In case k > t,
– Choose a prime Q and construct (k − 1)th degree polynomial h(x)modQ,
h(x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 mod Q,
where 0 < N, P1, P2, . . . , Pk < Q;
– Compute yi = h(Ii) mod Q for i = 1,2, . . . ,n;
– Compute h(i)modQ for i = 1,2, . . . , k − t;
– Publish
(
y1, y2, . . . , yn,h(1),h(2), . . . ,h(k − t)
)
.
• Recovery and veriﬁcation phase
Without loss of generality, suppose t or more members M1,M2, . . . ,Mt of M collaboratively recover the secrets P1, P2, . . . , Pk,
they execute the following steps:
(1) Mi supplies I
′
i
= Rsi
0
mod N, where si is the shadow ofMi;
(2) Anybody can verify the validity of I
′
i
provided by Mi: if I
′ f
i
= Ri mod N, then I′i is true; otherwise I
′
i
is false and Mi may
be a cheater;
(3) Recover the secrets: The polynomial h(x)modQ can be uniquely determined as follows:
k ≤ t
h(x) =
t∑
i=1
yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x − I′
j
I
′
i
− I′
j
mod Q
= P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q .
k > t
h(x) =
t∑
i=1
yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x − I j
Ii − I j
k−t∏
l=1
x − l
Ii − l
+
k−t∑
i=1
h(i)
k−t∏
j=1, j =i
x − j
i − j
t∏
l=1
x − Il
i − Il
mod Q
= P1 + P2x1 + · · · + Pkxk−1 mod Q .
3.1.2. Analysis and attack to ZZZ scheme
We notice that, when collaboratively reconstruct the shared secrets, only the validity of Ii provided by each Mi is checked
using equation I
f
i
= Ri mod N. But the consistence of Ii with yi is not veriﬁed. Based on this observation, a dishonest dealer D can
cheatMi by using an invalid yi which is inconsistent with Ii = Rs0i mod N. The attack comes as follows:
In the Construction phase, the dishonest dealer D performs:
In case k ≤ t
• D chooses a prime Q and construct (t − 1)th degree polynomial h(x)modQ,
h(x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 modQ
where 0 < P1, P2, . . . , Pk, a1, a2, . . . , at−k < Q;
• Assume Dwants to cheat participantMi, he/she ﬁrst randomly chooses Ji = Ii and computes y′i = h( Ji)mod Q, correctly
computes the other yj for j = 1,2, . . . ,n, j = i;
• D publishes (y1, y2, . . . , yi−1, y
′
i
, yi+1, . . . , yn).
In case k > t
• D chooses a prime Q and construct (t − 1)th degree polynomial h(x)modQ,
h(x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q,
where 0 < P1, P2, . . . , Pk, a1, a2, . . . , at−k < Q;
• Assume D wants to cheat participant Mi, he/she ﬁrst randomly chooses Ji(Ji = Ii) and computes y′i = h( Ji) mod Q,
correctly computes the other yj for j = 1,2, . . . ,n, j = i;
• D publishes
(
y1, y2, . . . , y
′
i
, . . . , yn,h(1),h(2), . . . ,h(k − t)
)
.
In the Recovery and veriﬁcation phase, the honestMi will supply I
′
i
= Rsi
0
mod Nwhich is really valid, since it does hold that I
′ f
i
=
Ri mod N. As any participant can by no means ﬁnd out y
′
i
is inconsistent with I
′
i
= Rsi
0
mod N, i.e. y
′
i
= h(Ii), in the reconstruction
phase, Mi and his collaborators will use the fake y
′
i
. As a result they will not recover the true secrets. In addition, when this
happens, it is hard for the collaborators to identify which yi is fake.
[Note]: Obviously, such attacks can also be extended to MS scheme [8].
Y. Liu et al. / Information Sciences 329 (2016) 524–539 5293.2. Security analysis and attacks to MS1 and MS2 schemes [9]
3.2.1. Analysis and attack to MS1 scheme
For space limitation, we omit the description of the original MS1 scheme. Please refer to [9] for details. The security drawbacks
of the MS1 scheme is similar to that of the ZZZ scheme. We notice that, when collaboratively reconstruct the shared secrets, only
the validity of Ii = f (r, si) provided by each Mi is checked using equation gIi = Gi mod p. While the consistence of Ii with the
[∗MS1] homogeneous linear recursive formula is not veriﬁed. Based on this observation, in the generation of sequence {ui}, a
dishonest dealer D can cheatMi by replacing the valid Ii = f (r, si)with an invalid I′i = f (r, s′i), where s′i = si. And any participants
are not able to detect. The attack comes as follows:
D randomly chooses Ji(Ji = si) and computes:{
I′
i
= f (r, Ji);
Ii = f (r, si);
Gi = gIi mod p.
If 1 ≤ i ≤ t
• D replaces the Ii with the I
′
i
to calculate the following [HLR] equations:
[∗]
{
u0 = I1,u1 = I2, . . . ,u′i−1 = I′i , . . . ,ut−1 = It ,
uj+t + a1uj+t−1 + · · · + atu j = 0 mod q ( j ≥ 0)
• D computes uj for t ≤ j ≤ n + k;
• D computes y j = I j − uj−1 for t < j ≤ n and r j = Pj − uj+n for 1 ≤ j ≤ k;
• D publishes (r,G1,G2, . . . ,Gi, . . . ,Gn, r1, r2, . . . , rk, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yn).
If t < i ≤ n
• D considers [HLR](Homogeneous linear recursion) which is deﬁned by the equations
[∗]
{
u0 = I1,u1 = I2, . . . ,ut−1 = It ,
uj+t + a1uj+t−1 + · · · + atu j = 0 mod q ( j ≥ 0)
• D computes uj, t ≤ j ≤ n + k;
• D replaces the Ii with the I
′
i
to compute y′
i
= I′
i
− ui−1, correctly computes the other yj for t< j≤ n, j = i and r j = Pj − uj+n
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
• D publishes (r,G1,G2, . . . ,Gi, . . . ,Gn, r1, r2, . . . , rk, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , y′i, . . . , yn).
Since Mi cannot ﬁnd out Ii = f (r, si) is replaced with an invalid I′i = f (r, s′i) by D, in the reconstruction phase, he and his collab-
orators will use the subshadow Ii = f (r, si) to recover the secrets. As a result they will fail to recover the true secrets. (Note that
any t or more honest participants without Mi can recover the true secrets.) In addition, when this happens, it is hard for the
collaborators to identify which Ii = f (r, si) is replaced by D. This fact indicates that the MS1 scheme cannot withstand cheating
by the dealer.
3.2.2. Analysis and attack to MS2 scheme
For the complete description of the MS2 scheme, please refer to [9]. We notice that, when collaboratively reconstruct the
shared secrets, only the validity of Ii = Rsi0 mod N provided by each Mi is checked using equation (Ii) f = Ri mod N, while the
consistence of Ii with the sequence {ui} generated from Homogeneous linear recursive formula [∗MS2] is not veriﬁed. Based on
this observation, a dishonest dealer D can cheatMi by replacing the valid Ii = Rs0i with an invalid I′i = ( Ji)s0 (Ji = Ri) in generating
the sequence {ui} or {yi}. The attack comes as follows:
D randomly chooses Ji(Ji = Ri) and computes:{
I′
i
= (Ji)s0 mod N;
Ii = (Ri)s0 mod N.
If 1 ≤ i ≤ t
• D replaces the Ii with the I
′
i
to compute the following [HLR] equations:
[∗]
{
u0 = I1,u1 = I2, . . . ,u′i−1 = I′i , . . . ,ut−1 = It ,
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 mod q (i ≥ 0)
• D computes ui for t ≤ i ≤ n + k;
• D computes yi = Ii − ui−1 for t < i ≤ n and ri = Pi − ui+n for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
• D publishes (R0, f, r1, r2, . . . , r , yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yn).k
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• D considers the sequence {ui} which is deﬁned by the formulas:
[∗]
{
u0 = I1,u1 = I2, . . . ,ut−1 = It ,
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 mod q (i ≥ 0)
• D computes ui for t ≤ i ≤ n + k;
• D replaces the Ii with the I
′
i
to compute y′
i
= I′
i
− ui−1, correctly computes the other yj for t< j≤ n, j = i and ri = Pi − ui+n
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
• D publishes (R0, f, r1, r2, . . . , rk, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , y′i, . . . , yn).
SinceMi cannot ﬁnd out Ii = Rs0i is replaced by D in the generation of sequence {ui} or {yi}, in recovery phase, he and his collabo-
rators will use the true Ii that is inconsistent with sequence {ui} or {yi}. As a result they will not recover the true secrets. (But any
t or more honest participants without Mi can recover the true secrets.) In addition, when this kind of cheating occurs, it is hard
for the collaborators to identify which Ii = Rs0i is replaced by D. This fact indicates that the MS2 scheme also cannot withstand
cheating by the dealer.
4. New VMSS schemes
To overcome the security drawbacks of the above analyzed VMSS schemes, we propose two newVMSS schemes in this section.
By adding some consistence checking measures, our new schemes effectively get rid of the security ﬂaws in ZZZ scheme, MS
scheme, MS1 scheme, and MS2 scheme. Our ﬁrst scheme is based on the ZZZ scheme introduced in [35] and Feldman’s VSS
scheme [12], and the second is based on the MS2 scheme [9]. The two new schemes can not only resist cheating by the dealer or
participants, but also remove the use of private channels.
4.1. Description of our scheme 1
Let D be the dealer,M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} be the set of participants, t( < n) be the threshold.
• Initialization phase
In this phase, the dealer (denoted as D ) ﬁrst creates a public notice board (NB) which is used for storing necessary public
information. The participants can access the information on NB. But the contents on the board can only be modiﬁed or
updated by D. Let λ be the security parameter. For our context, it should be chosen as the security parameter for a secure RSA
cryptosystem.
Initialization of the dealer D, D performs the following:
(1) Choose two large strong primes p0 and q0 (p0 > q0) with bit-length λ/2 satisfying the requirement of a secure RSA
public key cryptosystem [32], and compute N = p0q0 of bit-length λ.
(2) Compute φ(N) = (p0 − 1)(q0 − 1) which is Euler’s function, then safely destroy p0, q0.
(3) Choose primes q, Q such that Q|(q − 1), and the bit-length of Q is at least λ/2. Then randomly choose an element g of
Z∗q with order Q.
(4) D publishes (λ, N, Q, q, g) on NB.
Initialization of participants:
(1) Each Mi with identity information IDi chooses two strong primes pi and qi (pi > qi) of bit-length λ/2 , and computes
Ni = piqi which satisfy (Ni > N).
(2) Mi computes φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1).
(3) Mi randomly chooses an integer ei which is coprime to φ(Ni) and computes the integer di such that eidi =
1 (mod φ(Ni)).
(3) Mi provides authentically (IDi, ei, Ni) to D through a public channel, and keeps his shadow di secret.
D puts (IDi, ei,Ni), i = 1,2, . . . ,n, on NB.
[Note]: After the initialization phase, the information on NB can be reusable. The dealer D does not know any participant’s
shadow, so the shadow can be reusable for multiple rounds of sharing even with different dealers.
• Construction phase
Let P1, P2, . . . , Pk be the k secrets to be shared, 0 < Pi < Q, i = 1,2, . . . , k. The dealer D performs the following steps:
(1) In case k ≤ t
(1) D constructs a polynomial f(x)modQ of degree (t − 1):
f (x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q .
(2) D generates subshadow Yi for participant Mi: D randomly chooses n different integers C1,C2, . . . ,Cn such that
0 < Ci < Q, i = 1,2, . . . ,n and computes Yi = f (Ci) mod Q for i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
(3) D computes Hi for i = 1,2, . . . ,n,
Hi = Yei mod Ni.i
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Ai = gPi mod q (1 ≤ i ≤ k),
Ai = gai−k mod q (k < i ≤ t).
(5) D publishes (C1,C2, . . . ,Cn,H1,H2, . . . ,Hn,A1,A2, . . . ,At) on NB.
(2) In case k > t
(1) D constructs a polynomial f(x)modQ of degree (k − 1):
f (x) = P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 mod Q .
(2) D generates subshadow Yi for participant Mi, D randomly chooses distinct integers C1, C2, , Cn such that
0 < Ci < Q, i = 1,2, . . . ,n, and computes Yi = f (Ci) mod Q for i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
(3) D picks k − t distinct minimum integers η1, η2, . . . , ηk−t from Z∗Q − {Ci | i = 1,2, . . . ,n}, computes f(ηi)modQ
for i = 1,2, . . . , k − t .
(4) D computes Hi for i = 1,2, . . . ,n:
Hi = Yeii mod Ni.
(5) D computes Ai = gPi mod q, i = 1,2, . . . , k.
(6) D puts
(
C1,C2, . . . ,Cn,H1,H2, . . . ,Hn, η1, η2, . . . , ηk−t , f (η1), f (η2), . . . , f (ηk−t),A1,A2, . . . ,Ak
)
on NB.
• Veriﬁcation phase
Each participant Mi gets his subshadow by computing Yi = (Hi)di mod Ni for i = 1,2, . . . ,n. The validity of subshadows and
their consistence with the information published by D on NB can be veriﬁed by each participantMi as follows.
(1) If k ≤ t,Mi checks
gYi
?=
t−1∏
l=0
(Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q
(2) If k > t,Mi checks
gYi
?=
k−1∏
l=0
(Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q
gf (η j)
?=
k−1∏
l=0
(Al+1)
(η j)
l
mod q, j = 1,2, . . . , k − t
IfMi
′s veriﬁcation is successful,Mi believes the subshadow Yi he has got is valid and is consistent with the public information
on NB. If no participant fails in the veriﬁcation, D is thought honest.
Note that we add the consistency detection of all subshadows in the veriﬁcation phase. This is necessary for preventing the
dealer from distributing a fake subshadow to a participant. The weakness of the schemes attacked in the previous section is
mainly due to lack of such a detection.
• Recovery phase
Suppose t arbitrary participants {Mi}i∈I
(
I ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n}) pool their subshadows Yi to reconstruct the shared secrets. Each
participantMi(i ∈ I) can check whether others’ secret subshadows are valid and consistent by the following equations:
gYi
?=
k−1∏
l=0
(Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q, j ∈ I.
Once t valid subshadows are collected, the polynomial f(x)modQ can be uniquely determined as follows:
(1) If k ≤ t
f (x) =
(
t∑
i=1
Yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x −Cj
Ci −Cj
)
mod Q
= P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q
(2) If k > t
f (x) =
(
t∑
i=1
Yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x −Cj
Ci −Cj
k−t∏
l=1
x − ηl
Ci − ηl
+
k−t∑
i=1
f (ηi)
k−t∏
j=1, j =i
x − η j
ηi − η j
t∏
l=1
x −Cl
ηi −Cl
)
mod Q
= P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 mod Q
The structure of our scheme 1 is similar to that of the ZZZ scheme. The main difference lies in we use the RSA encryption
system while the ZZZ scheme uses Diﬃe–Hellman key exchange. A comparison of the two scheme is shown in Fig. 1. In the ZZZ
532 Y. Liu et al. / Information Sciences 329 (2016) 524–539
Fig. 1. The difference between our scheme 1 and ZZZ scheme.scheme, participant Mi chooses its secret shadow si and computes its subshadow as Ii = Rsi0 mod N using the public information
R0 = gs0 mod N published by the dealer D.Mi also sends Ri = gsi mod N to D as its public information corresponding to its secret
shadow si. D computes the subshadow ofMi as Ii = Rs0i mod N which is used in the computation of public information yi = h(Ii).
While in our new scheme, participant Mi generates a RSA public and private key pair ((ei, Ni), di). It sets the private key di as its
secret shadow and computes its subshadow as Yi = Hdii mod Ni using the public information Hi = Y
ei
i
mod Ni published by the
dealer D. Where D computes the subshadow Yi of Mi as Yi = f (Ci) mod Q from a publicly known Ci ∈ ZQ. D also publishes com-
mitments to the coeﬃcients of the polynomial f(x). To compare the two scheme, please note in the ZZZ scheme, three modular
exponentiation Ii = Rsi0 mod N, Ri = gsi mod N, and Ii = R
s0
i
mod N are needed forMi and D to compute the same subshadow Ii for
participant Mi. Whereas in our new scheme, only two modular exponentiation Yi = Hdii mod Ni and Hi = Y
ei
i
mod Ni are needed
for this purpose. More importantly, in the ZZZ scheme the dealer D does not commit to the public information yi. This weakness
makes it possible for the dealer D to cheat a participant Mi by publishing a fake yi as pointed in our attack. While in our new
scheme,this weakness is eliminated by requiring the dealer publishing commitment to the polynomial f(x).
4.2. Security analysis
The security of our scheme 1 is based on the discrete logarithm problem and the large integer factorization problem which
are assumed to be hard. We analyze the security of our scheme 1 from three aspects as formulated in the security model.
1. Correctness: If the dealer and the participants are honest, any t ormore participants can correctly reconstruct the set of secrets
using the recovery algorithm. This can be proved by the following equations.
• If k ≤ t
f (x) =
(
t∑
i=1
Yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x −Cj
Ci −Cj
)
mod Q
= P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 + a1xk + a2xk+1 + · · · + at−kxt−1 mod Q
• If k > t
f (x) =
(
t∑
i=1
Yi
t∏
j=1, j =i
x −Cj
Ci −Cj
k−t∏
l=1
x − ηl
Ci − ηl
+
k−t∑
i=1
f (ηi)
k−t∏
j=1, j =i
x − η j
ηi − η j
t∏
l=1
x −Cl
ηi −Cl
)
mod Q
= P1 + P2x + · · · + Pkxk−1 mod Q
2. Veriﬁability:
The following theorem shows that the dealer can not pass through veriﬁcation if he distributes inconsistent subshadows.
Theorem 1. Suppose the discrete logarithm in Z∗q with base g is intractable. Then the probability for the dealer successfully dis-
tributes a fake subshadow to any participant is negligible, and the success probability for a participant Mi in submitting a fake
subshadow in the recovery phase without being detected is also negligible.
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l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q, if k ≤ t; or Yi = f (Ci) mod Q, gYi =
∏k−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q, gf (η j) =∏k−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(η j)
l
mod q, j =
1,2, . . . , k − t, if k > t.
Without loss of generality, just consider the case k ≤ t. Assume that the dealer distributes an invalid subshadow Y ′
i
toMi that
passes the veriﬁcation. Then D has to ﬁnd a Y ′
i
= f (Ci) such that gYi
′
=∏t−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q. As gYi
′
=∏t−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q
implies the equation Y ′
i
= f (Ci)mod Q holds with probability 1, we conclude that the probability for the dealer D successfully
cheats any participant is negligible. 
Now consider the success probability for a participantMi in submitting a fake subshadow in the recovery phase without being
detected. Let Yi be Mi’s true subshadow obtained from the dealer. To successfully cheat in the recovery phase, Mi has to ﬁnd
a Y ′
i
= Yi, Y ′i ∈ Z∗Q such that gYi
′
=∏t−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q. Since gYi
′
=∏t−1
l=0 (Al+1)
(Ci)
l
mod q implies Y ′
i
= f (Ci) = Yi mod Q with
probability 1, we know that Mi’s success probability in submitting a fake subshadow in the recovery phase without being
detected is negligible.
3. Privacy:
To demonstrate that no useful information about the set of shared secrets are revealed to an adversary corrupting at most
t − 1 participants, we give the following two theorems with brief proofs. The ﬁrst one shows that the open commitments do
not reveal any useful information about the set of secrets and the subshadows, and the second one implies the conﬁdentiality
of the set of shared secrets against an adversary who corrupts up to t − 1 participants.
Theorem 2. The adversary E can not get any useful information about {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} and the subshadows possessed by any
participants from the public information under the assumptions that the RSA cryptosystem used in the system is secure, and the
discrete logarithm problem in Z∗q with respect to the base g is intractable. i.e. the commitments Ai, i = 1,2, . . . , t(or k), and Hi,
i = 1,2, . . . ,n do not reveal any useful information about the set of secrets and the subshadows.
Proof. In case k ≤ t, the public commitments are Ai = gPi mod q for i = 1, . . . , k, Ai = gai−k mod q for i = k + 1, . . . , t, Hi =
Yi
ei mod Ni for i = 1,2, . . . ,n. While in case k > t, the public commitments are Ai = gPi mod q for i = 1, . . . , k, Hi = Yiei mod Ni
for i = 1,2, . . . ,n. As computing the discrete logarithm to the base g is diﬃcult, the adversary can not derive any useful
information about the secrets and the polynomial f(x) from the open commitments. Secondly, to derive a subshadows Yi from
Hi without knowing Mi’s private key, one needs to break the RSA encryption scheme. So, the public information leaks no
useful information about the set of shared secrets and the subshadows. 
Theorem 3. An adversary corrupting up to t − 1 participants cannot derive any subshadow kept by an honest participant and
consequently cannot get useful information about the set of shared secrets.
Proof. We learn that the adversary cannot get any useful information about the secret polynomial f(x) from Theorem 2. Nev-
ertheless according to the algorithm of construction, to acquire the subshadows of those honest participants, the adversary
has no choice but compute f(x) merely using the subshadows of the corrupted ones. Without loss of generality we suppose
that the corrupted participants are {M1, . . . ,Mt−1}. The adversary has to compute all coeﬃcients of f(x) from the following
system of linear equations in ZQ:
• If k ≤ t⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P1 + P2C1 + · · · + PkCk−11 + a1Ck1 + · · · + at−kCt−11 = Y1
P1 + P2C2 + · · · + PkCk−12 + a1Ck2 + · · · + at−kCt−12 = Y2
...
P1 + P2Ct−1 + · · · + PkCk−1t−1 + a1Ckt−1 + · · · + at−kCt−1t−1 = Yt−1
i.e. ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 C1 · · · Ck−11 Ck1 · · · Ct−11
1 C2 · · · Ck−12 Ck2 · · · Ct−12
...
... · · ·
...
... · · ·
...
1 Ck · · · Ck−1k Ckk · · · Ct−1k
1 Ck+1 · · · Ck−1k+1 Ckk+1 · · · Ct−1k+1
...
... · · ·
...
... · · ·
...
1 Ct−1 · · · Ck−1t−1 Ckt−1 · · · Ct−1t−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P1
P2
...
Pk
a1
...
at−k
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y1
Y2
...
Yk
Yk+1
...
Yt−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P1 + P2C1 + · · · + PkCk−11 = Y1
P1 + P2C2 + · · · + PkCk−12 = Y2
...
P1 + P2Ct−1 + · · · + PkCk−1t−1 = Yt−1
P1 + P2η1 + · · · + Pkηk−11 = f (η1)
...
P1 + P2ηk−t + · · · + Pkηk−1k−t = f (ηk−t)
i.e. ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 C1 C
2
1 · · · Ck−11
1 C2 C
2
2 · · · Ck−12
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 Ct−1 C2t−1 · · · Ck−1t−1
1 η1 η21 · · · ηk−11
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 ηk−t η2k−t · · · ηk−1k−t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P1
P2
...
Pt
Pt+1
...
Pk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y1
Y2
...
Yt−1
f (η1)
...
f (ηk−t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
These are systems of linear equations where the rank of coeﬃcient matrices is less than the number of variables. That means
it has at least Q > 2λ/2 answers and the probability for the adversary to pick out the genuine {P1, P2, . . . , Pk, a1, . . . , at−k} are
not more than 1/Q ≤ λ/2. Accordingly the probability to calculate the subshadow of any uncorrupted participant is not more
than 1/2λ/2, which is a negligible function of the security parameter λ. 
From the above analysis, we can draw the conclusion that our scheme 1 is a secure VMSS scheme.
4.3. Scheme 2
In this section we present another new VMSS scheme based on the homogeneous linear recursion, the RSA cryptosystem and
the discrete logarithm problem. Let D be the dealer,M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} be the set of participants, t(t < n) be the threshold.
• Initialization phase
In this phase, the dealer D ﬁrst creates a public notice board (NB) which is used for storing necessary public information. The
participants can access the information on NB. But the contents on the board can only be modiﬁed or updated by D.
Initialization of D:
(1) On input a security parameter λ, D chooses two λ/2 bit strong primes p0 and q0 (p0 > q0), satisfying the requirement
of a secure RSA public key cryptosystem [32], and computes N = p0q0.
(2) D computes φ(N) = (p0 − 1)(q0 − 1), then safely destroy p0, q0.
(3) D randomly chooses two primes Q, q, such that Q|(q − 1), and the bit-length of Q is at least λ/2. D also selects an
element g of Z∗q with order Q such that the discrete logarithm problem with base g in Z∗q is infeasible.
(4) D randomly chooses another integer α = 0 and establishes the auxiliary equation:
(x − α)t = xt + a1xt−1 + · · · + at = 0.
(5) D publishes (λ, N, Q, q, g, α) on NB.
Initialization of participants:
(1) Each Mi with identity information IDi chooses two strong primes pi and qi (pi > qi), satisfying the requirement of a
secure RSA public key cryptosystem [32], and computes Ni = piqi which satisfy (Ni > N).
(2) Mi computes φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1).
(3) Mi randomly chooses an integer ei which is coprime toφ(Ni) and computes the integer di such that eidi = 1 (modφ(Ni).
(4) Mi authentically provides (IDi, ei, Ni) to D through a public channel, and keeps his shadow di secret.
D puts (IDi, ei, Ni), i = 1,2, . . . ,n, on NB.
we note that, similar to scheme 1, the information on NB can be reusable after the initialization phase. The dealer D does not
know any participant’s shadow, so the shadow can be reusable for multiple rounds of sharing even with different dealers.
• Construction phase
Let P1, P2, . . . , Pk ∈ ZQ denote k secrets to be shared. D chooses at random an integer ai such that Q > ai for i = 1,2, . . . , t . Then
D performs the following steps to generate a subshadow ui for each participantMi:
(1) Randomly choose Ci ∈ Z∗Q for i = 1,2, . . . , t .
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[∗]
{
u1 = C1,u2 = C2, . . . ,ut = Ct ,
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 mod Q (i ≥ 1)
and compute ui, t < i ≤ n + k.
(3) Compute Yi = Pi − un+i mod Q for i = 1,2, . . . , k.
(4) Compute Hi = (ui)ei mod Ni and Ti = gui mod q for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(5) Publish (H1,H2, . . . ,Hn, T1, T2, . . . , Tn,Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk) on NB.
• Veriﬁcation phase
Each participant Mi can get is subshadow by computing ui = (Hi)di mod Ni for i = 1,2, . . . ,n. The validity and consistence of
Mi’s subshadow ui with the information published by D on NB can be veriﬁed as follows:
Tt+i
t∏
j=1
(Tt+i− j)aj
?= 1 mod q
Ti
?= gui mod q
IfMi
′s veriﬁcation is successful,Mi believes the subshadow ui he has got is valid and is consistent with the public information
on NB. If no participant fails in the veriﬁcation, D is thought honest.
Similar to that in scheme 1, we add the consistency detection of all subshadows in the veriﬁcation phase. This is necessary for
removing the weakness of the schemes attacked in the previous section.
• Recovery phase
Assume that t or more arbitrary participants {Mi}i∈I
(
I ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n}) pool together their subshadows ui to reconstruct the
shared secrets. Each participant Mi can check whether the subshadows provided by the others are valid by the following
equations:
guj
?= Tj mod q, j ∈ I.
If there are at least t valid subshadows, the shared secrets can be correctly reconstructed. Suppose they use t valid subshadows
{ui|i ∈ J⊂ I}, they can get the following simultaneous equations using Lemma 1 in Section 2:
z0 + z1i + · · · + zt−1it−1 = uiα−i mod Q, i ∈ J.
Solving the equations (or equivalently using the technique of Lagrange interpolation ), they get (in ZQ) z0 = A0, z1 =
A1, . . . , zt−1 = At−1. Now, they have
ui = (A0 + A1i + · · · + At−1it−1)αi mod Q, ∀i ≥ t.
Hence they can reconstruct the shared secrets:
Pi = Yi + un+i mod Q, i = 1,2, . . . , k.
The difference between our scheme 2 and MS1 and MS2 schemes is shown in Fig. 2.
As seeing in Fig. 2, in scheme SM1, a participant Mi chooses its secret shadow si, and encrypts it using the public key of the
dealer D and sends the cipher text to D. After that both D andMi can computer the subshadow Ii = f (r, si) forMi. No information
is provided for detecting whether the Ii used in the [HLR] sequence is the same as the true subshadow of Mi. In scheme SM2,
a participant Mi chooses its secret shadow si, computes its subshadow as Ii = Rsi0 mod N using the public information R0 =
gs0 mod N published by the dealer D and sends Ri = gsi mod N to D as its commitment to its secret shadow si. D computes the
subshadow of Mi as Ii = Rs0i mod N which is used in the generation of the [HLR] sequence. Three modular exponentiations are
needed for the computation. No information for verifying whether correct Ii is used in the computation of the [HLR] sequence.
While in our scheme 2,Mi selects its secret shadow di and keeps it from the dealer. The subshadow ofMi is encrypted usingMi’s
public key corresponding to di and is provided in the public information. Only two modular exponentiations are involved for
the transmission of a subshadow. We require the dealer publish some information for verifying the consistence of participant’s
subshadow and the [HLR] sequence so that cheating behavior of the dealer can be detected.
4.4. Security analysis
The security of our scheme 2 is based on the discrete logarithm problem and the large integer factorization problem which
are assumed to be hard.
1. Correctness: If the dealer and the participants are honest, any t or more participants can reconstruct the set of the shared
secrets in the recovery phase. This fact can be shown as follows.
Suppose {Mi, i ∈ I} be a set of at least t honest participants. Let {ui, i ∈ I} be their corresponding subshadows obtained from
the honest dealer D. Using their subshadows, they can get the following equations
z0 + z1i + · · · + zt−1it−1 = u α−i mod Q, i ∈ I.i
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Fig. 2. The difference of our scheme 2 with MS1 and MS2 schemes.Solving this system of equations (or using the technique of Lagrange interpolation), they get
ui = (A0 + A1i + · · · + At−1it−1)αi mod Q, ∀i ≥ t.
Hence they can reconstruct the shared secrets:
Pi = Yi + un+i mod Q, i = 1,2, . . . , k.
2. Veriﬁability:
The following theorem shows that the dealer cannot pass through veriﬁcation if he distributes inconsistent subshadows. And
a dishonest participant is unable to submit a fake subshadow without being detected in the recovery phase.
Theorem 4. The probability for the dealer successfully distributing a fake subshadow to any participant without being detected is
negligible. At the same time, the probability for a dishonest participant submitting a fake subshadow without being detected in the
recovery phase is negligible.
Proof. Assume Mi’s valid subshadow is ui, and the dealer successfully distributes a fake subshadow u
′
i
to Mi. Then Ti = gui =
gu
′
i mod q, and Tt+i
∏t
j=1 (Tt+i− j)
a j = 1 mod q. Since ui,u′i ∈ ZQ , this implies that the probability for u′i = ui is negligible.
Similarly, if a dishonest participant Mi submits a fake subshadow u
′
i
without being detected in the recovery phase, then we
have Ti = gu
′
i = gui mod q. Hence, u′
i
= ui mod Q holds with probability 1. This means the probability for a participant Mi
successfully submitting a fake subshadow without being detected in the recovery phase is negligible. 
3. Privacy:
Theorem 5. Assume that computing discrete logarithm in Z∗q is diﬃcult and the RSA encryption scheme is secure. Then the pub-
lic information Ti, Hi, i = 1, . . . ,n, do not reveal any useful information about the set of shared secrets and the subshadows of
participants.
Proof. We know that Ti = gui mod q, Hi = (ui)ei mod Ni for i = 1, . . . ,n. As computing the discrete logarithm to the base g is
diﬃcult, the adversary cannot derive any useful information about subshadows from the open commitments T1, T2, . . . , Tn,.
Second, Since Hi is the RSA encryption of Mi’s subshadow ui, to derive ui from Hi the adversary E has to break the RSA
encryption scheme. Under the assumption that the RSA encryption scheme used in our construction is secure the adversary
gets no useful information about u1,u2, . . . ,un from H1,H2, . . . ,Hn. Without the knowledge of at least t subshadows of the
participants, the adversary cannot compute any of un+1,un+2, . . . , Tn+k due to the deﬁnition and properties of linear recursion
sequence uj. Hence the adversary gets no useful information about the set of shared secrets un+1 + Y1,un+2 + Y2, . . . ,un+k + Yk
from public information. 
Theorem 6. An adversary corrupts up to t − 1 participants cannot derive any subshadow kept by any honest participant and
consequently cannot get any of the shared secrets.
Proof. We learn that the adversary cannot get any useful information about the [HLR] from Theorem 5. Nevertheless accord-
ing to the algorithm in the construction phase, to acquire the subshadows of those honest participants, the adversary has no
choice but compute the [HLR] merely using the subshadows of the corrupted ones. Without loss of generality we suppose
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Table 1
Analysis of computation cost.
Scheme Initialization Construction Veriﬁcation Recovery
Dealer D EachMi Dealer D EachMi EachMi
ZZZ 0 1 n + 1 − t
MS 2n 1 0 − t − 1
MS1 n 1 n − t − 1
MS2 0 1 n + 1 − t
Scheme 1 0 0 n + t, k ≤ t t + 1, k ≤ t (t − 1)(k + 1)
Scheme 2 0 0 2n 2 t − 1that the corrupted participants are {M1, . . . ,Mt−1}. The adversary has to compute the sequence ui of [HLR] from the following
system of equations:{
u1 = C1,u2 = C2, . . . ,ut−1 = Ct−1
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 mod Q, i = 1,2, . . . ,n − t.
Namely, to compute any other subshadow uj, the adversary should solve the following system of linear equations using the
t − 1 subshadow u1 = C1,u2 = C2, . . . ,ut−1 = Ct−1:
ui+t + a1ui+t−1 + · · · + atui = 0 mod Q, i = 1,2, . . . ,n − t
Note that this system of linear equations consists of n − t equations, and there are n − t + 1 variables ut ,ut+1, . . . ,un. So
the rank of the coeﬃcient matrix is less than the number of variables. That means it has not less than Q answers and the
probability for the adversary to pick out the correct sequence ut−1+i (i ≥ 1) used in share distribution is not more than 1/Q.
Accordingly the probability to calculate the subshadow of any uncorrupted participant is not more than 1/Q. As Q > 2λ/2, this
probability is not more than 1/2λ/2, which is a negligible function of the security parameter λ. 
From the above analysis, we know that our scheme 2 is a secure VMSS without private channels.
5. Performance analysis
5.1. Computation cost
In comparing the computational cost of our schemes with some other schemes of the same type, we list the amount of the
most time consuming operations in each phase of these schemes. The most time consuming operations we consider here is
modular exponentiation. Table 1 shows the main computational cost of our new schemes and the four schemes analyzed in
Section 3.
As shown in Table 1, in the initialization and construction phases, our scheme 2 is the most eﬃcient. While our scheme1
is slightly more eﬃcient than MS and MS1 schemes (assume n > k), and less eﬃcient than ZZZ and MS2 schemes. All the six
schemes have almost the same computational cost in the recovery phase. Since we add consistence test to prevent cheating by
the dealer, the veriﬁcation phases of over new schemes require more modular exponentiations than in the other schemes. We
note that such added computational cost is necessary for preventing cheating by the dealer. Without this distinctive feature of
preventing cheating by the dealer, a so called veriﬁable secret sharing scheme will lose its real meaning for ”veriﬁability”. As
demonstrated in Section 3, it is the lack of such tests that makes the other four schemes vulnerable to cheating by the dealers.
As a whole, our new schemes are eﬃcient and have a comparable computational cost with respect to similar existing veriﬁable
multi-secret sharing schemes.
5.2. Communication cost
In Table 2, we list the communication cost in the initialization and construction phases of the six schemes, ZZZ scheme, MS
scheme, MS1 scheme, MS2 scheme, and our new schemes. The communication cost of the six schemes in the recovery phase is
almost the same. Table 2 indicates that our two new schemes are nearly as communication eﬃcient as the other four schemes
in the initialization phase, but slightly less eﬃcient in the construction phase. This ineﬃciency is due to we require the dealer
publish some redundant information for testing the consistence of the public information with the shadows and subshadows of
participants. Our analysis in Section 3 reveals that the insecurity of the other four schemes is exactly resulted from lacking of
such redundant information.
5.3. Main performance features
We also compare the main performance features of our new schemes with the other four schemes cited above. We consider
six main functionalities of a VMSS scheme.
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Table 2
Analysis of communication cost.
Scheme Initialization phase Construction phase
D Broadcast Mi toD D Broadcast
ZZZ (g, N) (IDi , Ri) (R0, f ), (y1, y2, . . . , yn), k ≤ t
(IDi,Ri), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n (R0, f ),
(
y1, . . . , yn,h(1), . . . ,h(k − t)
)
, k > t
MS (e,N, g, p), (r,Gi), i = 1,2, . . . ,n (IDi , Ti) (y1, y2, . . . , yn), k ≤ t
(IDi, Ti), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n (y1, y2, . . . , yn,h(1),h(2), . . . ,h(k − t)), k > t
MS1 (e, N, g, q, α) (IDi , Ti) (r,G1,G2, . . . ,Gn, r1, r2, . . . , rk, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yn)
(IDi, Ti), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n
MS2 (N, g, q, α) (i, Ti) (R0, f, r1, r2, . . . , rk, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yn)
(i, Ti), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n
Scheme 1 (λ, N, Q, q, g) (IDi , ei , Ni) (C1, . . . ,Cn,H1, . . . ,Hn,A1, . . . ,At), k ≤ t
(IDi, ei,Ni), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n
(
C1, . . . ,Cn,H1, . . . ,Hn, η1, . . . ,
ηk−t ,A1, . . . ,Ak, f (η1), . . . , f (ηk−t)
)
, k > t
Scheme 2 (λ, N, Q, q, g, α) (IDi , ei , Ni) (H1,H2, . . . ,Hn, T1, T2, . . . , Tn,Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk)
(IDi, ei,Ni), i = 1,2, . . . ,n i = 1,2, . . . ,n
Table 3
Performance features.
Functionality ZZZ scheme MS scheme MS1 scheme MS2 scheme Our scheme 1 Our scheme 2
1 NO NO NO NO YES YES
2 YES YES YES YES YES YES
3 YES YES YES YES YES YES
4 YES YES YES YES YES YES
5 YES YES YES YES YES YES
6 YES NO NO YES YES YES• Functionality 1: Resist cheating by the dealer D
• Functionality 2: Resist cheating by dishonest participantsMi
• Functionality 3: Without secret channel
• Functionality 4: Reconstruct multi-secrets parallelly
• Functionality 5: Reuse of the secret shadows
• Functionality 6: Reuse of the secret shadows for multiple rounds of sharing even with different dealers.
Table 3 shows that both of our new schemes possess all the six main performance features. While the other four schemes do
not have functionality 1, i.e. the cannot resist cheating by a dishonest dealer. The MS scheme and MS1 scheme do not possess
functionality 6. This means that the secret shadows of participants will useless after the recovery phase. So, the initialization of
participants has to be executed in every round of sharing even if the group of participants is not changed. Our two new schemes
effectively overcome this inconvenience. They allow participants reuse their secret shadows in different rounds of multi-secret
sharing even with different dealers. In this way, a participant could run the initialization of participant only once, and could use
the information generated in this execution of initialization in many rounds of multi-secret sharing no matter the dealers in
these round of sharing are different. This feature enables the participants to greatly reduce the cost of initialization in multiple
rounds of multi-secret sharing.
6. Conclusion
Veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes provide practical techniques for sharing multiple secrets in a group of participants
so that cheating behavior of a dealer or a participant can be detected. They are important tools in keeping multiple secrets such
as cryptographic keys, and in designing secure multi-party protocols. In this paper, we begin with re-analyze the security of four
recently proposed VMSS schemes. Our analysis reveals that all these schemes are subject to cheating by dishonest dealers. So
these schemes do not satisfy the basic security requirement of veriﬁable secret sharing schemes. We notice that the security
drawback of these schemes is induced by lacking of the consistence test of the information published by a dealer with the
subshadows of participants. Based on the analysis, we further put forward two improved VMSS schemes. In our new schemes,
we require the dealer to publish some redundant information for the necessary consistence checking. The security analysis and
performance analysis of our new schemes demonstrate that they are secure and eﬃcient veriﬁable multi-secret sharing schemes
withstanding cheating by the dealer or a participant, requiring no secret channels, allowing parallel reconstruct of multiple
secrets and reuse of shadows in different rounds of sharing even with different dealers.
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